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CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
Freedom to Read Foundation is a non-profit organization that does not have any 
parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held 
corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
American Library Association is a non-profit organization that does not have any 
parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly held 
corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
Asian/Pacific American Librarians Association is a non-profit organization that 
does not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists 
no publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock.  
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
Black Caucus of the American Library Association is a non-profit organization that 
does not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists 
no publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression is a non-profit organization 




that does not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there 
exists no publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
Comic Book Legal Defense Fund is a non-profit organization that does not have 
any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no publicly 
held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
National Association For Ethnic Studies is a non-profit organization that does not 
have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no 
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
National Coalition Against Censorship is a non-profit organization that does not 
have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no 
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), the 
National Council of Teachers of English is a non-profit organization that does not 
have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no 
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
Pursuant to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and 29(c)(1), 
REFORMA: the National Association to Promote Library and Information 




Services to Latinos and the Spanish-Speaking is a non-profit organization that does 
not have any parent corporations or issue stock and consequently there exists no 
publicly held corporation which owns 10% or more of its stock. 
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST 
The Freedom to Read Foundation is an organization established by the 
American Library Association to promote and defend First Amendment rights, 
foster libraries as institutions that fulfill the promise of the First Amendment, 
support the right of libraries to include in their collections and make available to 
the public any work they may legally acquire, and establish legal precedent for the 
freedom to read of all citizens.1   
The American Library Association (ALA) is the oldest and largest library 
association in the world providing advocacy, information, and resources to 
librarians and library users.  It actively defends the right of library users to read, 
seek information, and speak freely as guaranteed by the First Amendment.   
The Asian/Pacific American Librarians Association is an ALA affiliate 
supporting and promoting library services to the Asian American and Pacific 
Islander communities and advances the leadership roles of members through 
informed dialogue and forums.   
                                           
1 Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29(c)(5), Amici state that no party’s counsel authored 
this brief in whole or in part; that no party or party’s counsel contributed money 
that was intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief; and that no person 
other than Amici, their members, or their counsel contributed money that was 
intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief. 




The Black Caucus of the American Library Association advocates and 
promotes improvement of library services to the nation’s African American 
community.   
The American Booksellers Foundation for Free Expression (ABFFE) 
informs and educates booksellers and the public about the dangers of censorship 
and promotes the free expression of ideas, particularly freedom in the choice of 
reading materials. 
The Comic Book Legal Defense Fund (CBLDF) is dedicated to defending 
the First Amendment rights of comic book readers, publishers, retailers, librarians 
and educators.  
The National Association For Ethnic Studies (NAES) is the preeminent 
Ethnic Studies organization in the United States.  It supports the First Amendment 
rights to access, and freedom to read and speak about, the issues raised in ethnic 
studies materials.  
The National Coalition Against Censorship is an alliance of more than 50 
national organizations promoting free expression.  A signature program, the Youth 
Free Expression Project, defends young people’s right of access to information and 
their right to question, learn, and think for themselves.   
The National Council of Teachers of English (NCTE) is devoted to 
improving education in English and the English language arts.  It seeks to ensure 




students’ rights to read and to learn, and to promote professional growth for 
teachers.   
REFORMA: the National Association to Promote Library and Information 
Services to Latinos and the Spanish-Speaking, promotes the development of library 
collections to include Spanish-language and Latino-oriented materials and to 
develop library services and professionals that meet Latino communities’ needs. 
Amici are all deeply concerned about the effect of Arizona’s legislation on 
the First Amendment rights of its student-citizens.  By prohibiting certain 
categories of classroom materials and by eliminating the Tucson Unified School 
District’s Mexican-American Studies (MAS) program, the State of Arizona is 
infringing on students’ First Amendment rights to access books and classroom 
instruction. 
In accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 29(a), all parties have consented to the 
filing of this brief.   




SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The First Amendment protects the rights of students to access and receive 
information in the classroom.  These rights ensure that America’s youths are 
exposed to the diversity of ideas necessary to ensure an educated citizenry who can 
effectively participate in our democracy.  Arizona Revised Statute § 15-112 
threatens these rights.  For partisan and political reasons, the statute was aimed at 
and launched to dismantle Tucson’s MAS program.  Moreover, the statute is so 
broad that Arizona teachers and school districts must skirt a wide swath of 
protected instruction and material to avoid the possibility of serious penalties.  
Thus, the statute will chill a substantial amount of instruction that is beyond the 
purported purpose of the statute.   
This banning of books and courses from the classroom – both by direct 
application and by chilling effect – violates the First Amendment rights of 
students.   
 





I. SECTION 15-112 VIOLATES THE FIRST AMENDMENT BECAUSE 
IT FURTHERS POLITICAL AND PARTISAN INTERESTS, NOT 
LEGITIMATE PEDAGOGICAL PURPOSES. 
A. Students Have a First Amendment Right To Receive Information 
in Schools. 
Schools play a foundational role in shaping our society.  “‘[T]he public 
school is at once the symbol of our democracy and the most pervasive means for 
promoting our common destiny ....’”  Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 
(1987) (quoting Ill. ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) 
(opinion of Frankfurter, J.)).  As part of a public school’s obligation to shape and 
promote democracy, it must expose students to a range of ideas.  “The classroom is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’  The Nation’s future depends upon leaders 
trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 
truth out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative 
selection.”  Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).  Based on these principles, courts, 
including the district court below, have repeatedly recognized that students have a 
First Amendment right to receive information.  See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High 
Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1027 n.5 (9th Cir. 1998).   
Students have the right “to receive a broad range of information so that they 
can freely form their own thoughts: ‘[m]ore importantly, the right to receive ideas 




is a necessary predicate to the recipient’s meaningful exercise of his own rights of 
speech, press, and political freedom.’”  Id. (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 
853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion)) (alterations in original).  The “scrupulous 
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual,” and the student in 
particular, is necessary because schools “are educating the young for citizenship.”  
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969); accord 
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of 
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.”).  
 This right necessarily constrains State authority to censor curriculum, 
education materials, and classroom instruction.  To be sure, States and school 
boards have significant discretion in matters related to the education of students.  
See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988).  But this 
discretion is not boundless; it “must be exercised in a manner that comports with 
the transcendent imperatives of the First Amendment.”  Edwards, 482 U.S. at 583 
(quoting Pico, 457 U.S. at 864 (plurality opinion)) (quotation mark omitted).  For 
example, States may not for religious reasons either require schools to teach 
creationism or prohibit the instruction of evolution.  Id. at 594; Epperson v. 
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968).  Similarly, States may not dictate curriculum in 




a manner that violates students’ right to receive information.  Monteiro, 158 F.3d 
at 1027 n.5.    
B. A State May Not Withdraw Students’ Access to Curriculum 
Materials for Narrowly Partisan or Political Reasons. 
Under this framework, the First Amendment restrains a State from removing 
curriculum materials for narrowly partisan or political reasons.  In Pico, 457 U.S. 
at 870 (plurality opinion), the Supreme Court plurality held that while a school 
district “rightly possesses significant discretion to determine the content of their 
school libraries[,] ... that discretion may not be exercised in a narrowly partisan or 
political manner” to restrict students’ access to information.  The three dissenters 
“cheerfully concede[d]” that principle.  Id. at 907 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Thus, 
a majority of the Court agreed that removing books for partisan or political reasons 
will be unconstitutional where the removal occurs to deny students “access to ideas 
with which [the school officials] disagreed.”2  Id. at 871; accord Minarcini v. 
Strongsville City Sch. Dist., 541 F.2d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 1976) (privilege of access 
to books in library “is not subject to being withdrawn by succeeding school boards 
whose members might desire to ‘winnow’ the library for books the content of 
which occasioned their displeasure or disapproval”). 
                                           
2 Justifications for removing the books in Pico included that they were “anti-
American” and “offensive to Americans in general,” Pico, 457 U.S. at 873 – 
sentiments remarkably similar to those raised in Arizona.  See, e.g., ER 1055 (“It is 
certainly strange to find a textbook in an American public school taking the 
Mexican side of the battle at the Alamo.”).   




Although Pico arose in the context of school libraries, its reasoning cannot 
be cabined solely to the removal of books from libraries.  This Court has held that 
Pico’s principles “are also relevant in the context of a school curriculum.”  
Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1027 n.5.  Thus, although States and school districts have 
latitude to shape curriculum, they may not ban books from classroom instruction or 
eliminate courses merely because politicians disagree with the ideas expressed in 
some of the books.   
Strong justifications support applying Pico beyond the context of school 
libraries.  The harm from injecting partisan and political ideology into classroom 
curricula can be every bit as serious as the long-recognized harm caused by 
removing books from the library.  Id. at 1029 n.8 (discussing with approval Pratt v. 
Independent School District No. 831, 670 F.2d 771, 779 (8th Cir. 1982)).  Students 
who lose access to materials and courses suffer harm because they are denied the 
enrichment that comes from reading a book or poem and then discussing that 
material as part of a broader lesson.  Thus, the First Amendment harms flowing 
from censorship of the curriculum are real and identifiable.   
Other circuits have also recognized that the First Amendment constrains 
States and school boards from tampering with curricula by removing materials 




from instruction for political reasons.3  Students have a right “to be free from 
official conduct [regarding curriculum] that [is] intended to suppress the ideas 
expressed” in the materials removed from classroom instruction.  Pratt, 670 F.2d at  
776; see also, e.g., Zykan v. Warsaw Cmty. Sch. Corp., 631 F.2d 1300, 1306 (7th 
Cir. 1980) (“[A]cademic freedom at the secondary school level precludes a local 
board from imposing ‘a pall of orthodoxy’ on the offerings of the classroom, which 
might ... impair permanently the student’s ability to investigate matters that arise in 
the natural course of intellectual inquiry.” (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602)). 
Despite Monteiro’s embrace of Pico, the district court improperly held that 
Pico “does not apply directly” to the case at bar.  ER 11.  It held that Hazelwood – 
not Pico – provided the proper framework for analysis.  ER 14.  In Hazelwood, the 
Court held that school officials could exercise “editorial control” over the content 
of the journalism class’s school paper – which the Court characterized as “part of 
the school curriculum” – “so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  484 U.S. at 271, 273.   
                                           
3 Some cases since Pico have upheld States’ selection of curriculum materials; they 
are distinguishable because none involved the banning of books, materials, and 
courses from the curriculum for political reasons.  See Griswold v. Driscoll, 616 
F.3d 53, 55, 58-60 (1st Cir. 2010) (Pico did not apply to revisions to curriculum 
guide that did not ban use of other materials); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 615-
17 (5th Cir. 2005) (State selection of preferred textbooks did not violate students’ 
First Amendment rights); Virgil v. Sch. Bd. of Columbia Cnty., 862 F.2d 1517, 
1523 n.8 (11th Cir. 1989) (declining to decide standard when curriculum materials 
are removed due to “opposition to the ideas contained in the disputed materials”). 




But Pico and Hazelwood are not mutually exclusive.  Properly read, these 
two cases articulate a consistent view of State discretion over schools, including 
curriculum.  Although States have significant curricular discretion, it must be 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
273.  Pico illustrates one instance where such legitimate concern is lacking: where 
materials are removed from a school library not for pedagogical reasons, but due to 
partisan or political disapproval of, and an intent to suppress, the ideas expressed in 
those materials.  See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-72.  Similarly, if books (or entire 
courses) are removed from school curricula for narrowly partisan or political 
reasons, the State’s action violates the students’ First Amendment rights.  
Nor can the state rely on the government speech doctrine to justify an 
unfettered right to remove materials.  The broad discretion to shape curriculum 
does not include the power to indulge partisan or political motivations.  
Accordingly, the district court properly held that the government speech doctrine 
has no application in this case.  
C. The Tucson MAS Program Was Targeted by State Authorities 
Based on Partisan and Political Motivations. 
Applying Pico to § 15-112, it is clear that both the enactment of the statute 
and the determination that MAS (but not other ethnic studies programs) violated 
the statute were “narrowly partisan or political” decisions by officials who had 




long sought removal of the MAS program, and who had even campaigned on a 
promise to remove it.   
1. Section 15-112 Was Enacted Based on Animus Toward the MAS 
Program and Mexican Immigrants. 
There is strong evidence that the statute itself was motivated by political 
animus toward the MAS program specifically and toward Mexicans and Mexican-
Americans more generally.  Started to address a federal desegregation order, the 
MAS program had significantly closed the achievement gap for Latino students 
who took MAS classes.  ER 197-204, 1964-2016.  However, in 2006, Tucson High 
Magnet School hosted invited guest Delores Huerta, co-founder of the United 
Farm Workers of America, to address the student body.   During her remarks, she 
commented that “Republicans hate Latinos.”  ER 1054.  In response, then-
Superintendent Tom Horne invited another speaker to “refute” Ms. Huerta’s 
statements.  Id.  During that presentation, at which no questions were allowed, a 
group of students silently walked out in protest.  ER 1055.   
Horne’s response was to write an “Open Letter to the Citizens of Tucson” 
calling for the termination of the MAS program.  ER 1053.  Demonstrating that 
politics – not academic content – was at issue, Horne praised the “polite[]” 
behavior exhibited by “teenage Republicans,” but criticized the “rudeness” of 
protesting students.  ER 1055.  In Horne’s view, this “rudeness” was due to the 




MAS program and teachers, who Horne was concerned were “left-leaning” and 
“progressive[].”  ER 1055, 1057.    
Importantly, these criticisms arose in the context of a broader political 
debate in Arizona about immigration – particularly from Mexico.  While it was 
considering outlawing courses “designed” for one ethnic group, the Arizona 
legislature was also enacting other anti-immigration laws that were then challenged 
in federal court.  See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); 
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011), aff’g sub nom. 
Chicanos Por La Causa, Inc. v. Napolitano, 558 F.3d 856 (9th Cir. 2009).  Indeed, 
the legislative history of § 15-112 reflects the view that MAS is part of Mexico’s 
plan “to take over the southwest United States.”4  Other testimony opposed the 
MAS program because “I absolutely deplore people who come from another 
country and do not want anything to do with the culture, the language, or anything 
that has to do with our government ....”5  Finally, the two officials – 
Superintendents Horne and Huppenthal – whose findings have required the 
elimination of the MAS program both vigorously pursued the legislation while 
                                           
4 Hearing of H. Comm. on Appropriations, 48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., at 37:09-
37:22 (Ariz. Apr. 16, 2008), 
http://azleg.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=7&clip_id=3485&meta_id=6
0106. 
5 Id. at 21:12-21:24.  




announcing their political opposition to the MAS program.  Indeed, Huppenthal 
campaigned for office on a pledge that he would “[S]top La Raza.”6  ER 1288. 
2. Superintendents Horne and Huppenthal Eliminated the MAS 
Program for Political Reasons.  
Once § 15-112 was enacted, Horne and his immediate successor, 
Superintendent Huppenthal, wasted no time in targeting and dismantling the MAS 
program.  In fact, Horne issued his findings the day before the statute even became 
effective, noting, in passing, that several other ethnic studies programs in Arizona 
might also violate the statute, but confining his findings to the MAS program.  
ER 28.  As the district court explained,  
Superintendent Horne issued his Finding of Violation on his last day 
in office, December 30, 2010.  His Finding went into effect January 1, 
2011, the same day that § 15-112 went into effect.  The timing of the 
Finding underscores Horne’s determination to do away with the MAS 
program, and it also means that Horne necessarily applied the statute 
retroactively, without any effort to show that the problematic 
materials were in use at the time of the Finding.   
ER 27 (citation omitted).  Indeed, Horne’s findings essentially parroted the same 
political concerns expressed in his “Open Letter” almost three years earlier.  
Compare ER 2183-92 with ER 1053-58.     
Meanwhile, as chair of the Senate education committee, Senator Huppenthal 
worked to pass the bill while pledging in his political campaign for Superintendent 
to eliminate MAS.  See ER 1256-57.  After winning the Superintendent spot, 
                                           
6 “La Raza” is used to refer to the MAS program.  See ER 1287. 




(replacing Tom Horne), he initially commissioned an independent, third-party 
audit of the entire MAS curriculum.  See ER 1092.  But when the auditors found 
“no observable evidence was present to suggest that any classroom within Tucson 
Unified School District is in direct violation of the law A.R.S. 15-112(A),” ER 
2251, Huppenthal looked for another opinion.  Preferring his own expertise, he 
conducted his own personal review and identified specific classroom materials that 
he concluded violated the statute.  See ER 1092-94, 1098-1104.      
These circumstances demonstrate that the statute and Huppenthal’s findings 
were motivated by a narrow political and partisan interest in denying access to 
materials with which the decisionmakers disagreed.  As applied to the MAS 
program, Arizona Revised Statute § 15-112 violates the First Amendment rights of 
the plaintiffs because it removed the students’ access to the MAS curriculum 
materials for narrowly partisan and political reasons.  See Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-
71.7   
                                           
7 Should the Court conclude that this significant record includes disputed facts, it 
should, at the very least, consider remanding the case for further development of 
these factual issues.  




II. SECTION 15-112 IS OVERBROAD BECAUSE IT WILL CHILL 
SUBSTANTIAL MATERIALS STUDENTS HAVE A FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO RECEIVE. 
Even if § 15-112 were passed for a legitimate pedagogical purpose, the 
statute is nevertheless unconstitutional because it is overbroad and will chill 
substantial instruction that would not violate its purpose.     
A. A Statute Restricting Materials or Curriculum Is 
Unconstitutionally Overbroad if it Chills Substantial Instruction 
Beyond the Purpose of the Law.  
The district court properly recognized that § 15-112 is unconstitutional if it 
chills substantial instruction that does not further the statute’s purpose.  See ER 15-
16.  “In a facial challenge to a law’s validity under the First Amendment, the law 
may be invalidated as overbroad if a substantial number of its applications are 
unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.”  
Comite de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach, 657 F.3d 936, 
944 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 449 U.S. 460, 473 
(2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1566 (2012). 
“The overbreadth doctrine exists ‘out of concern that the threat of 
enforcement of an overbroad law may deter or “chill” constitutionally protected 
speech ....’”  Id. (quoting Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003)).  In the 
specific context of education, this means that although a State may limit materials 
and curricula where its “actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 




concerns,” Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273, that control goes too far where the threat 
of enforcement results in schools excluding other materials that do not raise those 
pedagogical concerns.  And where the chilled instruction is “substantial,” the law 
must be held to be unconstitutional.  See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 473.  
The asserted purpose of § 15-112 is to ensure that students are “taught to 
treat and value each other as individuals” and not be “taught to resent or hate other 
races or classes of people.”  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111.  Amici certainly agree that 
this is a legitimate pedagogical purpose, and that the State can reasonably decide 
that Arizona schools should inculcate tolerance, respect, and understanding – not 
hatred and resentment.  But because students have a First Amendment right to 
receive information and access materials in the classroom, see Monteiro, 158 F.3d 
at 1027 n.5, § 15-112 must be held to be unconstitutional if the breadth of the 
statute causes teachers or schools to discard or avoid substantial material that 
would not run afoul of the state’s interest in teaching students “to treat and value 
each other as individuals,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111. 
B. Severe Sanctions, Like Those Here, Establish Substantial 
Overbreadth. 
When evaluating overbreadth, the severity of the sanction is a significant 
factor in evaluating whether the statute will chill substantial protected speech.  The 
possibility of a “substantial number of realistic applications in contravention of the 
First Amendment” is sufficient to overturn a statute, and “the penalty to be 




imposed is relevant in determining whether demonstrable overbreadth is 
substantial.”  Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 595-96 (1989) (quotation 
marks omitted).  This is so because when a law is overbroad, the threat of severe 
penalties will cause many individuals to “choose not to speak because of 
uncertainty whether his claim of privilege might prevail if challenged.”  Bates v. 
State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 380 (1977). 
Here, the entire school district risks up to ten percent of its State funding for 
a single violation.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(B).  And it was designed that way.  
Horne emphasized that the statute’s financial penalties were sufficiently severe to 
frighten schools into compliance:  “In my eight years as superintendent of schools, 
I’ve never seen a district not come into compliance when faced with a severe 
financial penalty.”  Horne: Tucson District Violates Ethnic Studies Ban, 
MyFoxPhoenix.com, (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.myfoxphoenix.com/story/18140282/horne-tucson-district-violates-
ethnic-studties-ban.    
The penalty applies to an entire district, not just to the school or program 
with the offending material.  And since schools generally allocate funds well in 
advance of the school year (to hire teachers, acquire books and materials, etc.), the 
district-wide penalty threatens the special chaos inherent in re-balancing multiple 
budgets that have already been committed or spent.  In this era of falling tax 




revenues and state budget constraints, responsible educators are unlikely to risk 
even a remote possibility of such a significant financial hit.   
This severe penalty will chill educators from choosing a significant amount 
of protected material which would not violate the statute, and which students have 
a First Amendment right to receive.  Instead, “rather than undertake the 
considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-
by-case litigation, [they] will choose simply to abstain from protected speech – 
harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an 
uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”  Hicks, 539 U.S. at 119  (citation omitted).  
Where, as here, the marketplace at issue is the classroom, which “is peculiarly the 
‘marketplace of ideas,’” Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603, this chill has a wide reach.8 
C. The Statute Is Overbroad Because Educators Cannot Know What 
Materials Are Allowed and Which Are Forbidden. 
To ensure that “public school pupils should be taught to treat and value each 
other as individuals and not be taught to resent or hate other races or classes of 
people” the statute lists four categories of content which may not be “included” in 
                                           
8 The 60-day period before financial freezing begins does not mitigate the threat.  
Teachers cannot re-vamp an entire curriculum in mid-course, especially for classes 
required by the State.  Additionally, as the MAS program demonstrated, books 
deemed offensive will be physically removed from the classroom (boxed up and 
locked away), see ER 1164-67, with no money to purchase replacements.  Given 
the risk to continuity of teaching, the risk of losing significant monies, and the risk 
of losing actual materials with no replacements, teachers will be forced to choose – 
and students will only receive – materials that raise no risk of loss.   




the program of instruction.  Ariz. Rev. Stat. §§ 15-111, 15-112(A).  Yet these 
forbidden categories encompass materials far beyond the stated purpose of the 
statute.  Moreover, although the statute speaks of “courses or classes,” both 
Superintendent Huppenthal and the Administrative Law Judge named specific 
books, poems, and classroom materials in finding a violation.  See ER 1092-94, 
1098-1104, 1132-42.9  Thus, observers can only conclude that the use of a single 
book or poem can render the “course or class” illegal.  As applied, then, the statute 
will inevitably chill educators from presenting a wide range of serious literature 
and history relating to topics such as revolution, oppression, and racism. 
1. Section 15-112(A)(1) – Promoting “the overthrow of the United 
States government” 
The first category prohibits material promoting the overthrow of the 
government.  This is not the first attempt to restrict such materials.  Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has invalidated a similar state statute which prohibited teachers 
from advising, teaching, or advocating the forceful overthrow of the government.  
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 599-602.  While the Court accepted that the State had a 
legitimate interest “in protecting its education system from subversion,” id. at 602, 
                                           
9 When evaluating the overbreadth of a statute, a court must consider the State’s 
own implementation and interpretation of the statute.  Forsyth Cnty. v. Nationalist 
Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131 (1992); see also Comite de Jornaleros, 657 F.3d at 
946. 




the law was nonetheless unconstitutional because teachers could not know what 
sort of conduct was prohibited.   
Does the teacher who carries a copy of the Communist Manifesto on a 
public street thereby advocate criminal anarchy?  It is no answer to 
say that the statute would not be applied in such a case. ... The teacher 
cannot know the extent, if any, to which a ‘seditious’ utterance must 
transcend mere statement about abstract doctrine, the extent to which 
it must be intended to and tend to indoctrinate or incite to action in 
furtherance of the defined doctrine.  The crucial consideration is that 
no teacher can know just where the line is drawn between ‘seditious’ 
and nonseditious utterances and acts. 
Id. at 599.  
Here, despite the fact that “promote” and “advocate” are essentially 
synonymous, the District Court held that “promote” was not overbroad because it 
must mean “actively presenting material in a biased, political, and emotionally 
charged manner.”  ER 18.  This gloss is wholly missing from the statute, but even 
accepting it, the statute is no less vague or overbroad.  Indeed, this gloss may make 
the statute even broader, since the prohibition now seems to turns on the style of 
the teaching or whether the material at issue has an emotional component.     
Suppose, for example, that a teacher assigned students to read an essay by 
Henry David Thoreau, who advocated the right to revolt against the government.  
Thoreau wrote:  
All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse 
allegiance to and to resist the government, when its tyranny or its 
inefficiency are great and unendurable. ...  [W]hen a sixth of the 
population of a nation which has undertaken to be the refuge of liberty 




are slaves, and a whole country is unjustly overrun and conquered by 
a foreign army, and subjected to military law, I think that it is not too 
soon for honest men to rebel and revolutionize.  What makes this duty 
the more urgent is that fact, that the country so overrun is not our own, 
but ours is the invading army. 
Henry David Thoreau, Resistance to Civil Government (1849), reprinted in Henry 
D. Thoreau Essays 145, 149 (Jeffery S. Cramer ed., 2013).  Certainly this work – 
which urges not just a right but an actual duty to revolt against the government in 
certain circumstances – can be understood to “promote” the overthrow of 
government.  Can a teacher use this text at all?  Does the use depend on whether 
the teacher “actively” presents the material in an “emotionally charged” manner?  
If the material itself is emotionally charged, as Thoreau’s call to arms certainly is, 
and the teacher asks the students to consider it in connection with current 
American political life, is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the teacher is 
“promoting” the overthrow of government by presenting the views of another 
American who promoted that end? 
Or suppose the curriculum involves George Orwell’s 1984, a dystopian 
novel that warns of the threats posed by a totalitarian government propped up by 
surveillance and censorship.  If the teacher asked students to compose essays 
comparing Orwell’s Big Brother to the current U.S. National Security 
Administration using documents released by Edward Snowden, would such a 
project risk being deemed one that promotes the overthrow of the U.S. 




government?  Would that conclusion depend on whether the teacher is deemed to 
have displayed “bias” by bringing up the current political example of the NSA to 
illuminate the theme and lessons of the novel?    
 Just as the statute in Keyishian violated the Constitution because teachers 
could not tell when the line had been crossed between non-seditious and seditious, 
so too § 15-112(A)(1) creates an uncertain and wide no-man’s land where teachers 
cannot know what characteristics will separate either permitted materials or means 
of teaching those materials from those which are prohibited.  American history and 
literature are filled with stories of the valiant, as well as the quisling, acting in 
rebellion against the government.  The threat that teaching a novel or poem with 
rebellious sentiment might be deemed to promote the overthrow of the U.S. 
government is nearly certain to chill a broad range of instruction which students 
have a First Amendment right to receive, especially in light of the significant 
penalty to be paid for guessing wrong.   
2. Section 15-112(A)(2) – Promoting “resentment toward a race or 
class of people” 
The district court applied the same analysis it applied to (A)(1) to uphold 
(A)(2).  For the reasons discussed above, this decision is flawed.  Nor is it 
consistent with the way the State actually applied the provision.  Indeed, 
Huppenthal concluded the MAS program violated this provision, in part, because 
particular class materials “repeatedly reference white people as being ‘oppressors’ 




and ‘oppressing’ the Latino people,” or “present only one perspective of historical 
events, that of the Latino people being persecuted.”  ER 1093.  Huppenthal 
identified this passage from American History from Chicano/a Perspectives as an 
example of text that promotes resentment toward a race or class of people:  
Within [sic] the exception of genocide, one of the worst crimes 
committed by the European invaders against indigenous peoples was 
the destruction of nearly all their culture, thought [sic] beliefs, 
traditions, and language.  This atrocity has left the majority of the 
hemisphere’s indigenous population in disarray and confusion as to 
their true identity. 
ER 1098.   
If this relatively straightforward passage justifies a finding that the 
curriculum using that passage violates § 15-112(A)(2), it is hard to see how 
teachers could present materials describing racism, slavery, imperialism or 
genocide without risking a similar finding.  Thus, they will avoid serious and 
substantial works that explore these themes, such as Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness, which tells the story of imperialism and racism in Africa.  The Diary of 
Anne Frank poses a risk since it presents the holocaust from only one perspective.  
Including any of these books in a course which invites students to actually engage 
with the materials could easily be found to “[p]romote resentment toward a race or 
class of people,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(A)(2), particularly when compared with 
the text found so offensive by Huppenthal.  And this is so even though these 
materials can be (and usually are) used to spark discussions that promote tolerance 




among students who use them to explore the harms caused by political and racial 
hatred and resentment.10   
The specter of the serious financial and political consequences of violating 
the statute, combined with the uncertainty regarding which materials may be found 
improper, will lead Arizona’s responsible teachers to avoid materials that raise 
themes of racism, imperialism, or genocide.  Thus the statute will smother 
materials and courses requiring students to wrestle with these issues, despite the 
fact that the State has asserted no interest in censoring such materials.   
3. Section 15-112(A)(3) – “Are designed primarily for pupils of a 
particular ethnic group” 
The district court properly held this provision to be overbroad.  It did so 
because the provision did not advance the pedagogical interest underlying the 
statute, but it “threaten[ed] to chill the teaching of legitimate and objective ethnic 
studies courses.”  See ER 19.  The Court of Appeals should uphold this portion of 
the District Court’s decision because, like the others, this provision threatens to 
substantially chill the use of books and literature well beyond those that further the 
interests of the statute.   
                                           
10 This Court has also identified books which are claimed to “portray Caucasians in 
a derogatory fashion” and which could therefore be seen to promote resentment of  
Caucasians, such as Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon and Mark Mathabane’s  
Kaffir Boy, for example.  Monteiro, 158 F.3d at 1030 & n.11.  Under § 15-112, 
those works would likely be avoided for fear of violating the statute. 




Superintendent Huppenthal criticized materials in the MAS curriculum that 
“address the reader as being of Latino or Hispanic origin and thus a part of an 
oppressed people.”  ER 1093.  For example, he found violations in text that read, 
“The process of dehumanization since the arrival of the White Nation (not a 
pejorative term) has stripped away our true identity.”  ER 1102.  But if addressing 
a reader as one of a kindred group disqualifies a book, then teachers will avoid 
Maya Angelou’s autobiography which contains graphic and painful descriptions of 
her experiences, as a child in the American South, of rape, hate, and racism:  “My 
race groaned.  It was our people falling.  It was another lynching, yet another Black 
man hanging on a tree.  One more woman ambushed and raped.”  Maya Angelou, I 
Know Why the Caged Bird Sings 131 (Random House 1997) (1969).  And students 
will not be allowed to engage in class with Amy Tan’s The Joy Luck Club, which 
dissects the relationships and conflicts between Chinese immigrant mothers and 
their American-raised daughters.  Because this provision, like the others, sweeps 
far too broadly for First Amendment purposes, the district court properly 
invalidated it.    
4. Section 15-112(A)(4) – Advocating “ethnic solidarity instead of the 
treatment of pupils as individuals.” 
The last section of the statute, prohibiting courses that “advocate” ethic 
solidarity, is also overbroad.  Conceding that this provision “would not survive” 
scrutiny if it simply proscribed courses that “taught ethnic solidarity,” the district 




court nevertheless held that the “instead of the treatment of pupils as individuals” 
language saved the provision by making it reasonably related to “legitimate 
pedagogical concerns.”  ER 21.   
Again, the State’s interpretation of the provision undercuts this analysis.  
Huppenthal and the ALJ found the MAS program violated the provision because 
some classes in that program included particular books that were perceived as 
being too focused on “ethnic solidarity.”  Yet they paid no regard to whether the 
class also advocated for individual treatment of persons.  Thus, the limiting 
language does not cure the overbreadth the district court recognized.  For example, 
Superintendent Huppenthal cited the following as an exemplar of text that violates 
the statute: “Since then Raza resistance has never died and that is the message of 
this book. ... We saw that the enemy wasn’t simply the gringo but a system that 
dictated how U.S. society should be organized.  Capitalismo, imperialism, 
socialism ... racism.”  ER 1103 (alterations in original).   
But if permitted works can address ethnic identity only if they advocate 
individualism “instead of” ethnic identity, then teachers will necessarily avoid 
books that present ethnic identity because of the risk that they will trigger the 
penalties.  Thus, a teacher would likely believe that the Autobiography of Malcolm 
X is prohibited since there, the author wrote, “I reflected many, many times to 
myself upon how the American Negro has been entirely brainwashed from ever 




seeing or thinking of himself, as he should, as a part of the nonwhite peoples of the 
world.”  Malcom X, The Autobiography of Malcom X As Told To Alex Haley 352 
(Random House 1999) (1964).  Similarly, Chinua Achebe’s Things Fall Apart is 
praised for telling the story of colonialism from the perspective of Africans.  Yet it 
is critical of the destruction of tribal culture that occurred after Europeans occupied 
Africa.  Is that book prohibited if it does not advocate the treatment of people as 
individuals instead of ethnic solidarity?  
Even assigning Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a Birmingham Jail” 
could risk sanction since Dr. King expresses frustration at the inaction of moderate 
whites:  
I have almost reached the regrettable conclusion that the Negro’s great 
stumbling block in his stride toward freedom is not the White 
Citizen’s Counciler or the Ku Klux Klanner, but the white moderate, 
who is more devoted to “order” than to justice; who prefers a negative 
peace which is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is the 
presence of justice; who constantly says: “I agree with you in the goal 
you seek, but I cannot agree with your methods of direct action”; who 
paternalistically believes he can set the timetable for another man’s 
freedom ....  
Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From a Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), available 
at http://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html.   
 Do these materials discussed above “advocate ethnic solidarity” instead of 
individualism because they reflect that strength can come from such solidarity?  If 
not, how would a teacher distinguish them from the materials Huppenthal found 




violated the provision?  Because teachers will not be able to tell what materials and 
curriculum will be sufficiently individualistic and which focus too much on “ethnic 
solidarity,” they are likely to avoid materials altogether that relate to ethnic 
solidarity, thus accomplishing the very end that the District Court noted would be 
unconstitutional.   
The point, of course, is not that Dr. King – or any of the other authors 
discussed above – actually did advocate for ethnic solidarity, promote resentment 
against a race, promote the overthrow of the government, or write primarily for a 
specific ethnic group.  The point is that these books illuminate both the strengths of 
solidarity and the weaknesses of insularity and separation.  Yet in light of materials 
Arizona has declared forbidden under the statute, teachers cannot know what 
materials risk a similar finding, and they will therefore avoid materials raising 
these themes at all.  They will be forced to teach about the civil rights movement, 
Jim Crow, the revolutionary war, slavery, colonization, and Manifest Destiny 
while trying to avoid the risk that a single book or poem addressing the ethnic and 
racial history bound up in our country’s history could be quoted out of context and 
declared in violation of the law.11   
                                           
11 Nor would a State’s assurance that it would not use the statute unreasonably 
remedy the overbreadth.  This Court must “not uphold an unconstitutional statute 
merely because the Government promised to use it responsibly.”  Stevens, 559 U.S. 
at 480. 




D. The Narrowing Provisions Cannot Save the Statute from this 
Overbreadth.   
Although subsections (E) and (F) of the statute appear designed to narrow 
the scope of the law, they neither narrow its scope nor alleviate its chill.  Both the 
text and application of the statute demonstrate that even instruction that appears to 
fall within the language of these narrowing clauses can violate the statute.   
First, subsection (E)(3) is a circular provision that states that “[c]ourses or 
classes that include the history of any ethnic group and that are open to all 
students” are not restricted “unless the course or class violates subsection A.”  
Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-112(E)(3) (emphasis added).  In other words, anything that 
would be illegal under subsection (A) is still illegal under subsection (E)(3).  This 
savings provision saves nothing.  If material used in a class could fall within one of 
the forbidden subject areas, the fact that the class includes ethnic history and is 
open to all students is entirely irrelevant and provides no safe harbor.   
Similarly, while the statute purports not to reach “[c]ourses or classes that 
include the discussion of controversial aspects of history,” id. § 15-112(E)(4), or 
“the historical oppression of a particular group of people,” id. § 15-112(F), the 
statute clearly does reach those courses since nothing in the saving clause provides 
a safe harbor for teaching those subjects if the materials or classes are found to 




violate subsection (A).12  And it is clear that the context of a class will not “save” 
particular materials.  To the contrary, the Administrative Law Judge found, and 
Superintendent Huppenthal adopted the conclusion, that as to the materials at issue,  
there was “no way to use the materials without being in violation of the law.”  ER 
1146 (emphasis added).  In other words, under the State’s interpretation, the 
context in which a book is taught is irrelevant for purposes of § 15-112.  In short, 
the exceptions provisions of the statute provide no “exceptions” at all.  Cf. Stevens, 
559 U.S. at 479 (holding that exceptions clause did not save overbroad statute 
because “[t]here is simply no adequate reading of the exceptions clause that results 
in the statute’s banning only the depictions the Government would like to ban”). 
Thus, the exceptions will not alleviate teachers’ legitimate fear.  They create 
no safe harbor that will allow teachers to use materials in the classroom that 
address the forbidden issues, without fear of incurring the significant penalties.     
Under § 15-112, classroom instruction and students’ access to information 
on topics that the State has asserted no legitimate pedagogical interest in restricting 
will be substantially restricted.  Students’ exposure to important but painful parts 
of history, the voices of the oppressed, and the writings of controversial figures 
will be squeezed out of the classroom – even if these subjects are discussed in a 
                                           
12 Indeed, one of the reasons the MAS program was found to violate the statute was 
that a book spoke of oppression from the perspective of the oppressed group.  ER 
1090.   




manner that does teach students “to treat and value each other as individuals” and 
not “to resent or hate other races or classes of people,” Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 15-111.  
The statute must be ruled unconstitutionally overbroad.  
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Arizona Revised Statute § 15-112 violates the 
First Amendment.  
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